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Abstract—In the past few years, Convolutional Neural Net-
works (CNNs) have been achieving state-of-the-art performance
on a variety of problems. Many companies employ resources and
money to generate these models and provide them as an API,
therefore it is in their best interest to protect them, i.e., to avoid
that someone else copy them. Recent studies revealed that state-
of-the-art CNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples attacks,
and this weakness indicates that CNNs do not need to operate in
the problem domain (PD). Therefore, we hypothesize that they
also do not need to be trained with examples of the PD in order
to operate in it.
Given these facts, in this paper, we investigate if a target black-
box CNN can be copied by persuading it to confess its knowledge
through random non-labeled data. The copy is two-fold: i) the
target network is queried with random data and its predictions
are used to create a fake dataset with the knowledge of the
network; and ii) a copycat network is trained with the fake
dataset and should be able to achieve similar performance as the
target network.
This hypothesis was evaluated locally in three problems (facial
expression, object, and crosswalk classification) and against a
cloud-based API. In the copy attacks, images from both non-
problem domain and PD were used. All copycat networks
achieved at least 93.7% of the performance of the original
models with non-problem domain data, and at least 98.6% using
additional data from the PD. Additionally, the copycat CNN
successfully copied at least 97.3% of the performance of the
Microsoft Azure Emotion API. Our results show that it is possible
to create a copycat CNN by simply querying a target network
as black-box with random non-labeled data.
Index Terms—deep neural network; convolutional neural net-
work; adversarial examples; security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) is a category of
Deep Neural Network (DNN) that has recently been achieving
state-of-the-art performance on a variety of problems, such
as visual classification and recognition, object detection, and
others. Given its outstanding performance in a wide range
of tasks, many companies started to offer solutions based on
these neural networks. In fact, several companies already have
APIs (Application Programming Interfaces) that give access
to their deep learning models. Most of them provide (e.g.,
Amazon AWS, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud, BigML, etc.)
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Fig. 1: On the left, the target network is trained with an
original (confidential) dataset and is served publicly as an API,
receiving images as input and providing class labels as output.
On the right, it is presented the process to get stolen labels
and to create a fake dataset: random natural images are sent
to the API and the labels are obtained. After that, the copycat
network is trained using this fake dataset.
cloud-based services to customers allowing them to offer their
own models as an API. Because of the resources and money
invested in creating these models, it is in the best interest of
these companies to protect them, i.e., to avoid that someone
else copy them.
Some works have already investigated the possibility of
copying models by querying them as a black-box. In [1], for
example, the authors showed how to perform model extraction
attacks to copy an equivalent or near-equivalent machine
learning model (decision tree, logistic regression, SVM, and
multilayer perceptron), i.e., one that achieves close to 100%
agreement on an input space of interest. In [2], the authors
evaluated the process of copying a Naive Bayes and SVM
classifier in the context of text classification. Both works
focused on general classifiers and not on deep neural networks
that require large amounts of data to be trained leaving
the question of whether deep models can be easily copied.
Although the second uses deep learning to steal the classifiers,
it does not try to use DNNs to steal from deep models.
Additionally, these works focus on copying by querying with
problem domain data.
In recent years, researchers have been exploring some
intriguing properties of deep neural networks [3], [4]. More
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specifically, investigating why someone can cause the network
to misclassify an image by applying a certain imperceptible
perturbation to the image. These properties makes state-of-the-
art CNNs vulnerable to adversarial examples attacks [5]–[8].
In this type of attack, an image of a certain class, and predicted
as such by a trained CNN, is modified by adding some non-
visible noise so that the network prediction is changed to a
different label and the attacker gets the system to perform
in a directed manner. This property indicates that CNNs
do not need to operate the problem domain. Therefore, we
hypothesize that they also do not need to be trained with
examples of the problem domain in order to operate in the
problem domain. In the counter side, works have also been
done to try to avoid such attacks [9], [10], but, in general,
state-of-the-art CNNs are still vulnerable.
Given the imperfection of these models and the enormous
amount of data required to train such models, questions arise
on whether they can be easily copied when made available as
a black-box.
In this work, we present a novel and simple, yet powerful,
method to copy a black-box CNN model by persuading it
to confess its knowledge through random non-labeled data.
The copying is performed in two steps (Figure 1). First, the
target network is queried with random non-labeled data and
the pairs of input image and output label are used to create
a fake dataset with the knowledge of the network. Second, a
copycat network is trained with the fake dataset and should
be able to achieve similar performance as the target network.
This method was evaluated in three problems (facial ex-
pression, object, and crosswalk classification). In addition, a
copy attack was performed against a cloud-based API from
Microsoft. The copy attacks were performed with two different
types of random data (non-problem domain and problem
domain). These two types of data enables answering whether
a CNN requires problem specific training data in order to
operate properly in a specific domain. Our results showed that
all copycat networks were able to achieve at least 93.7% of
the performance of the original models. When the training was
performed with additional images from the problem domain,
the copycat networks were able to achieve at least 98.6% of the
performance of the original models. An experiment with the
Microsoft Azure Emotion API also showed that the proposed
method can successfully (+97%) copy the performance of
a black-box model. In conclusion, the study demonstrated a
weakness of CNN models that can cost a lot for companies,
i.e., showed that it is possible to create a copycat CNN by
simply querying a target network as black-box with random
non-labeled data.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time the
process of copying a deep CNN (black-box) model using
random unlabeled data is investigated. Our findings open up
doors for future investigations in the field of transfer learning.
Our results showed that the copy is possible even in real
world problems since the method was evaluated using different
combinations of databases and problem domains to copy the
performance of a target network.
The main contributions of this paper can be listed as follows:
• A technique to copy black-box CNN models;
• The finding that a model can be copied using ordinary
natural and non problem related images;
• Extensive evaluation shows it is viable on different prob-
lems and big datasets.
II. RELATED WORKS
There are few works in the literature when it comes to
the investigation of attacks to black-box models, even less
involving deep models. Some of these works are presented in
this section.
In [7], the authors used a black-box target DNN to provide
labels to an augmented version of the MNIST database. After
that, a substitute DNN was generated, using this dataset,
achieving over 80% of accuracy. The substitute DNN is, then,
used to craft adversarial samples against the target DNN. The
intention was approximate the decision boundaries of the target
DNN just to craft adversarial examples. A refinement to this
technique was proposed in [5]. There, the authors transfered
the knowledge from machine learning classifiers (DNN, lo-
gistic regression, SVM, decision tree, nearest neighbor, and
ensembles) to a deep model (again, used to mimic the decision
boundaries of the original classifier). They also used MNIST
dataset. In addition, the substitutes were able to approximate
only about 77% to 83% of accuracy in the test set, with 48%
for the decision trees.
Another related paper is [2], where a deep learning classifier
is trained with input data labeled by a target classifier. The
authors generated two classifiers for text classification based
on a binary dataset: Naive Bayes and SVM. To steal these
classifiers, the authors generated two deep learning classifiers
that were able to produce high fidelity labels of 97.9% and
97.44% of accuracy, respectively, similar to the target models.
In [1], the authors use partial knowledge of models and
equation solving to train similar models with the goal of
achieving an equivalent or near-equivalent machine learning
model. Their black-box attack had successful results on deci-
sion tree, logistic regression, SVM, and multilayer perceptron
against BigML and Amazon Machine Learning. However,
given the cost to copy shallow models, their approach seems
not to be scalable to DNN models.
Different from these previous works, we investigate a copy
attack from a deep model (seen as the target network) to
another deep model (which we call copycat network). In
addition, our investigation uses real-world datasets from three
different problems. Moreover, our method leverage not only
data from the same problem domain, but also random natural
images found in public datasets and in the Internet. Fur-
thermore, this study works with high-dimensional inputs and
deeper neural networks. Lastly, an attack against a public API
is also performed.
III. COPYCAT CONVOLUTIONAL NEURAL NETWORK
The proposed method aims at copying a target network into
a copycat version by only performing queries with random
natural images. It mainly comprises two main steps: fake
dataset generation and copycat network training. In the first
step, a fake dataset is generated using random natural images
labeled by a given model (target network used as black-box).
Then, a copycat network is trained with this fake dataset
aiming to copy the performance of the target network.
A. Fake Dataset Generation
In order to train a copycat network, a dataset is required. We
propose to use a fake dataset annotated by the target network.
The fake dataset name was chosen because the dataset actually
comprises images that are not related to the problem domain
or images that are related to the problem domain, but might
not be properly labeled. Therefore, the fake dataset is totally
different from the one originally used to train the target
network.
Initially, suppose that there is a target network (in this
case, a CNN) that can be used only as a black-box, i.e., it
receives images as input and provides class labels as output.
The assumption that the classification space is larger than
the one occupied by training examples [3], [4], [11] leads
to the assumption that the CNN can and will make mistakes.
Nonetheless, to ensure all nuances of the model are captured,
a large-scale and varied dataset seems to be required. This
dataset can be either made of images from the same problem
domain as the target network or made of random natural
images. In this work, both approaches as explored. In the
first case, it is assumed that the attacker has images from the
same problem-domain (PD) of the one used to train the target
network. In the second case, it is assumed that the attacker has
nothing but access to publicly available large-scale datasets,
i.e., random natural images or non-problem-domain (NPD)
images. In both cases, original labels (if they are available,
which is not required) are assumed to be irrelevant. Therefore,
they are discarded.
To generate the fake dataset, the attacker uses the target
network itself to automatically label these datasets (PD and/or
NPD). These labels generated by the target network are
referred in this work as stolen labels (SL). The labeled fake
dataset is expected to capture the nuances of the feature space
that would enable another network to be trained and achieve a
performance close to the target network. As explained before,
this assumption is based on the fact that the input image of a
CNN can be perturbed by imperceivable noise in order to get
the network answer in a certain direction.
Considering the fact that in real applications it is not easy to
acquire images of a certain domain, the PD dataset is expected
to be smaller than NPD. The non problem domain in the
other hand can be freely found on the Internet. Then, when
dealing with small databases sizes (e.g., the PD datasets) data
augmentation procedures (explained in the Section IV-E) can
help increasing the database size in order to better exploit the
high-dimensionality space of the target network.
B. Copycat Network Training
After generating a fake dataset, the training of a copycat
network can be performed. In a first step, the attacker would
choose a copycat model architecture. Note that the attacker
might not know the model architecture of the target network
to perform the copy, but this should not hinder the copy of
the knowledge to a different model.
In order to assist the comparison process, in this work,
the model was fixed to a well known architecture (VGG-
16 architecture [12], referred to as VGG only) that, in the
performed experiments, was the same for the target and
copycat networks.
The VGG was originally created to work with face recog-
nition and, therefore, has a predefined output layer for that
specific problem domain. This might also be the case for the
architecture chosen, by an attacker, to be the copycat of a
target network. Therefore, the output of the chosen model has
to be adapted to the problem domain of the target network,
i.e., the number of outputs of the copycat has to be changed
to match the number of classes handled by the target network.
The literature has shown that, in general, it is a good practice
to start training from pre-trained models [13]. Therefore,
whenever available, the chosen model should load pre-trained
weights to the unchanged layers even if the attacker has a
big fake dataset. Since the output was changed to match
the problem domain, it has to be initialized with random
weights (e.g., using [14]). There are several pre-trained models
available nowadays. If available, preference should be given to
pre-trained models closer to the problem domain. Otherwise,
one should use generic pre-trained models, such as the models
pre-trained on the ImageNet.
Finally, the process of training a copycat network consists
of finetuning the pre-trained with the fake dataset.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
This section presents the experimental methodology of
creating a copycat from a target black-box CNN. Figure 2
presents an overview of the experimental methodology. The
proposed method is compared to two baselines (the original
network and an alternative version trained with less data from
the problem domain) using a test dataset, while considering
three types of copycats (one trained with data not related to
the problem domain, one trained with data from the problem
domain, and one trained with the former and fine-tuned with
the latter). Each of the three copycat networks are evaluated
in three different real-world problem types: Facial Expression
Recognition (FER), General Object Classification (GOC) and
Satellite Crosswalk Classification (SCC).
A. Test Dataset and Baselines Methods
For all experiments, there is one dataset used for testing the
performance (test dataset), and there are two methods used
as baselines: i) the original target network trained with the
original dataset (OD) and ii) an alternative version trained with
less data of the problem domain with their original labels (PD-
OL). The test dataset and baselines are detailed below.
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Fig. 2: Experimental methodology to evaluate the copying
process. (1) represents the target network trained with original
domain dataset, ODD (used as baseline). (2) represents the
baseline network trained with a small set of images from the
problem domain with original labels, PD-OL. (3) represents
the network trained with images from the problem domain
with stolen labels, PD-SL. (4) represents the images from the
non-problem domain with stolen labels, NPD-SL. (5) repre-
sents the finetuning of NPD-SL network with PD-SL dataset,
NPD+PD-SL. The accuracy for all networks is obtained on test
dataset (TD) and compared with the target network accuracy
and with the baseline network accuracy PD-OL.
1) Test Dataset (TD): This dataset is used to evaluate the
performance of all networks (baselines and copycats). This
dataset comprises images from the same problem domain as
the target network, but with no overlap. In our experiments,
one dataset is defined as the test dataset (TD) and it is only
used to test the networks of a given problem domain. None
of the models have access to the data of this dataset.
2) Network Trained With Original Domain (OD): This
network plays the role of the target network being copied.
Since in real scenario this network would only provide a
black-box API access, the original dataset used for training is
confidential and not known by copycat networks. In general,
the creation of this dataset is expensive for companies and
access is not granted to the outside world, which increases
the value of the network model. Ideally, the copycat should
be able to copy this network keeping 100% of accuracy. In
our experiments, one dataset is defined as the original domain
dataset (ODD) and is used to train the target network. No other
model have access to the data of this dataset.
3) Network Trained with Problem Domain Data and Origi-
nal Labels (PD-OL): This network plays the role of a cheaper
model created to try to replicate the original model. Although
it is not easy to get access to the amount of data used to train
the original model, it might be possible to get access to a
smaller amount of data from the problem domain in order to
train a cheaper model. This baseline model tries to replicate
this situation and enables a comparison verify whether the
copycat can replace the need for these cheaper models, in case
they are not able to fully copy the original model. Images used
to train this network are different from the ones used to train
the original network, but are in the same problem domain.
Note that data augmentation can be performed to increase the
size of these datasets in order to enable a fair comparison,
since deep models require a lot of data to be trained. In our
experiments, one dataset is defined as the problem domain
dataset (PDD) and is used to train the PD-OL baseline model.
B. Copycat Networks
Experiments consider three types of copycats: i) network
trained with the fake dataset created with random natural
images not related to the problem domain, i.e., non-problem
domain with stolen labels (NPD-SL); ii) network trained with
the fake dataset created with images from the same problem
domain as the target network, i.e., network trained with
problem domain and stolen labels (PD-SL); and iii) network
trained with the fake dataset (created with images from the
first) and fine-tuned with images from the second.
1) Network Trained with Non-Problem Domain and Stolen
Labels (NPD-SL): This copycat network intends to evaluate
whether the proposed method is able to copy a target model
using only random natural images. In this case, it is assumed
that the attacker might not have data from the same domain.
Nonetheless, he still can use publicly available images from
the Internet to query the target network and build a fake
dataset. Therefore, samples of this dataset comprises random
natural images labeled by the target network. Since these
images are different from those in problem domains evaluated
in this work, only one dataset was built with non-problem
domain images (NPDD) and used in all experiments with
NPD-SL. In total, the NPDD comprises 3,297,259 images
from ImageNet (ILSVRC2017 and Visual Domain Decathlon)
[15], and 123,403 images from Microsoft COCO [16]. Note
that fake dataset labels (i.e., stolen labels) are generated using
the target network. Therefore, these labels can be different
from originals, which implicates a different distribution of
images per class for each evaluated problem, as discussed in
the Section V-E.
2) Network Trained with Problem Domain and Stolen
Labels (PD-SL): This copycat network intends to evaluate
whether the proposed method is able to copy a target model
using a small set of images of the same problem domain
as the target network. In this case, it is assumed that the
attacker might have access to a small set of data from the same
domain, but does not have their labels. Therefore, the samples
of this dataset comprises images of the same problem domain
as the original dataset, but labeled by the target network.
In our experiments, the dataset used for training the PD-SL
network is the same as the one used in the PD-OL network,
i.e., problem domain dataset (PDD). However, it uses labels
predicted by the target network instead of the original labels
provided with the dataset.
3) Network Trained with NPD-SL and fine-tuned with PD-
SL (NPD+PD-SL): This copycat network intends to evaluate
whether the performance of the proposed method is improved
when combining the two previous models NPD-SL and PD-
SL. In this case, it is assumed that the attacker has access to
publicly available images not related to the problem domain
and to a small set of data from the same domain, but does not
have their labels. Therefore, the NPD-SL network is further
fine-tuned with the data used to train the PD-SL network.
C. Problems
In order to evaluate the proposed method with different real-
world problems, three domains were chosen: Facial Expression
Recognition, General Object Classification and Satellite Cross-
walk Classification. Additionally, the method was evaluated in
a publicly available API.
1) Facial Expression Recognition (FER): In the facial
expression recognition problem, there are usually six basic
universal [17] expressions that are widely used in the literature:
fear, sad, angry, disgust, surprise and happy. In addition,
some works in literature also take the neutral expression into
consideration. In this work, seven facial expressions were
used (six basic plus neutral). In the literature, there are
avaiable several widely known facial expression recognition
datasets. Therefore, in this work, a cross-database protocol
was followed, i.e., databases for different purposes (e.g., train
and test) are always different. The Extended Cohn-Kanade
Database (CK+) [18] was chosen to compose the test dataset
(TD). For composing the original domain dataset (ODD), the
following datasets were chosen: AR Face [19], Bingham-
ton University 3D Facial Expression (BU3DFE) [20], The
Japanese Female Facial Expression (JAFFE) [21], MMI [22]
and Radboud Faces Database (RaFD) [23] datasets. Finally,
the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF) [24] was
chosen to compose the problem domain dataset (PDD). Data
augmentation was used as described in [25] to increase the
dataset size and ensure the balance between classes. Given
that most of these databases are grayscale, the NPD dataset
was changed to grayscale as well, in this problem only.
All networks started the training from a pre-trained model
originally trained for facial recognition [26]. The number of
outputs of the copycat networks was set to 7.
2) General Object Classification (GOC): Object classifica-
tion is a highly studied problem in computer vision. There
are several definitions of object types, and they are chosen
according to the problem. This work followed the definition
of the classical CIFAR-10 [27] and STL-10 [28] datasets that
are based on 10 classes. Due to a mismatch between their
classes, one class from each one was removed (“frog” from
CIFAR-10 and “monkey” from STL-10), resulting in a total of
nine classes for this problem. Because of that, the order of the
labels was changed so ensure that the same label was referring
to the same class in both datasets. The CIFAR-10 is originally
divided in training and test data. Therefore, the CIFAR-10 test
data was chosen to compose the test dataset (TD), whereas the
CIFAR-10 training data was chosen to compose the original
domain dataset (ODD). Finally, the whole STL-10 wsa used
to compose the problem domain dataset (PDD). All networks
started the training from a pre-trained model on the ImageNet
[12]. The number of outputs of the copycat network was set
to 9.
3) Satellite Crosswalk Classification (SCC): The Cross-
walk classification problem is a binary classification problem
based on satellite imagery [29]. It comprises satellite imagery
from 3 continents (Europe, America, and Asia) distributed
in 2 classes: crosswalk and no-crosswalk. The images were
automatically collected from online APIs [29]. To compose
the test dataset (TD), 15% of the images from Europe were
randomly selected. The remainder 85% of the images from
Europe were chosen to compose the original domain dataset
(ODD). Finally, images from America and Asia were used
to compose the problem domain dataset (PDD). All networks
started the training from a pre-trained model on the ImageNet
[12]. The number of outputs of the copycat network was set
to 2.
4) Microsoft Azure Emotion API: An attempt to copy the
performance of a publicly available cloud-based API was
performed. The Microsoft Azure Cognitive Services provides
an Emotion API1, which allows an user to send a picture and
receive as response the locations of the faces and “emotions”
recognized for each face. This API has three pricing options:
free, basic and standard tiers. The free tier allows for a
reasonable amount of transactions at no cost, but it seems
prohibitive for the scale of our experiments due to the number
of queries necessary to generate the stolen labels. The basic
and standard tiers basically differ in terms of the accepted
input formats: the basic requires the user to send the location of
the face in the requested image to obtain the expression, while
the standard firstly localizes the faces and then recognizes the
expressions (at a higher cost per transaction). As the faces are
well defined in our databases, we decided to use the basic tier.
The cost and time to generate required fake datasets can be
seen in the Table I.
TABLE I: Microsoft Azure Pricing to Generate Fake Datasets
PD NPD
Images 65, 660 3, 420, 662
Cost $6, 57 $342, 07
Time 01h49m 3d23h01m
The NPD and PD datasets were the same as the ones used
in the FER problem. To label the images, as the face location
was required by the basic tier (and NPD images may have no
faces at all), all images were given as if the faces were the
whole image. In addition, the “contempt” expression used by
the API was discarded, because of the very low prediction rate
by the API (less than 60 out of +3.42 million images). The
number of outputs of the copycat network was set to 7.
1https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/pricing/details/cognitive-services/
emotion-api/
D. Metrics
In order to account for possible data imbalance in the
test datasets, the macro-averaged accuracy was used. The
macro average computes a simple average over the classes.
To measure the performance of the copycat networks, their
accuracies were compared with the baselines’ models. In
addition to the macro-averaged accuracy, it is also reported
the ratio between the performance of a given network and
both the target network (OD) and the smaller problem domain
network (PD-OL). These metrics are called performance over
target network and performance over PD-OL network.
The perfect copycat network should achieve a macro-
averaged accuracy identical to the target network (i.e., it should
hit and miss the same images as the target network) and
achieve 100% of performance over the target network.
E. General Setup
All models were trained using Stochastic Gradient Descent
(SGD) with a Step Down policy for the learning rate. The
maximum of five epochs was chosen because the models
showed convergence accuracy after this number of epochs
in empirical experiments. However, the training of the target
networks had more than five epochs, until their losses reached
a plateau. The target network was trained with the respective
original domain dataset (ODD) for 30 epochs in FER, 20
epochs in GOC, and 5 epochs in SCC. In the augmentation
process, the following operations were applied: add/sub in-
tensity, contrast normalization, crop, horizontal flip, Gaussian
blur, Gaussian noise, piecewise affine, rotate, scale, sharpen,
shear, and translate. These operations are combined to generate
22 types of augmentation. For each original image, each
augmentation type generates 3 synthetic images. The original
label is maintained for each synthetic image.
All experiments were carried out using an Intel Core i5-
7500 3.40GHz with 32GiB of RAM and NVIDIA GeForce
GTX 1070 with 8GiB of memory. The environment of the
experiments was GNU/Linux Mint 18.1, with NVIDIA CUDA
Framework 9.0 and cuDNN 7.0. The training and test phases
were performed using Caffe [30]. The augmentation process
used the imgaug2 python package. The scripts, the network
models with weights, and a detailed description of each dataset
and experiment were publicly released3.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this work, a process to create a copycat of a given (target)
network is evaluated. In this context, three different problems
were chosen to perform experiments: facial expression, object,
and crosswalk classification. For each experiment, copycat
networks (NPD-SL, PD-SL, and NPD+PD-SL) were compared
with two baselines (OD and PD-OL), aiming to assess the
capability to obtain equivalent or near-equivalent network
performance using random natural images and stolen labels.
The results of the experiments for each problem are presented
in the next subsections, followed by a discussion of them.
2https://github.com/aleju/imgaug
3https://github.com/jeiks/Stealing DL Models
A. FER
TABLE II: Performance Results for the FER Experiment
Networks Macro Average(accuracy)
Performance over
target network
Performance over
PD-OL network
OD (Target) 88.7% – –
PD-OL 82.5% 93.0% –
NPD-SL 83.0% 93.7% 100.7%
PD-SL 83.4% 94.1% 101.2%
NPD+PD-SL 87.4% 98.6% 106.0%
The FER results are presented in the Table II. As can be
seen, the target network accuracy was 88.7% and the PD-OL
network was 82.5%, which reached 93.0% performance over
target network. Although PD-OL is able to achieve a good
performance in this problem, all the other copycat networks
improved over its performance.
The NPD-SL network was able to achieve 93.7% of perfor-
mance over target network and 100.7% of performance over
PD-OL network, reaching better accuracy than the network
trained with the data from the problem domain. The PD-
SL network performance was slightly better (1.1%) than
the PD-OL network. The best performance was achieved by
the NPD+PD-SL network, where images from the problem
domain improved the NPD-SL network accuracy in 4%. When
compared to the original network, it is only about 1% below
in absolute accuracy.
B. GOC
TABLE III: Performance Results for the GOC Experiment
Networks Macro Average(accuracy)
Performance over
target network
Performance over
PD-OL network
OD (Target) 95.3% – –
PD-OL 82.1% 86.2% –
NPD-SL 94.0% 98.6% 114.4%
PD-SL 90.0% 94.4% 109.5%
NPD+PD-SL 94.0% 98.6% 114.4%
The GOC results are presented in the Table III. The target
network accuracy was 95.3% and the PD-OL network accu-
racy was 82.1%, which reached 86.2% performance over target
network.
The NPD-SL network presented great results, achieving
98.6% of performance over target network and exceeded in
14.4% of performance over PD-OL network. Therefore, the
copycat network trained with data from a different domain
reached a performance near to the target network. The PD-SL
network performance over target net was 9.5% better than the
PD-OL network, which indicates the importance of the stolen
labels in the copy process.
The lowest accuracy was of PD-OL network and the greatest
accuracy was achieved by both the NPD-SL and NPD+PD-
SL network. The PD-SL dataset did not improve the NPD-SL
network in this problem domain.
TABLE IV: Performance Results for the SCC Experiment
Networks Macro Average(accuracy)
Performance over
target network
Performance over
PD-OL network
OD (Target) 95.8% – –
PD-OL 92.8% 96.9% –
NPD-SL 95.0% 99.2% 102.4%
PD-SL 94.9% 99.1% 102.2%
NPD+PD-SL 95.1% 99.3% 102.5%
C. SCC
The SCC results are presented in the Table IV. The target
network accuracy was 95.8% and the PD-OL network was
92.8%, which reached 96.9% performance over target net-
work.
In this experiment, all networks trained with stolen labels
achieved a high performance over target network with less
than 1% of difference. These three networks also achieved a
higher performance than the PD-OL network.
The NPD-SL network achieved a better performance than
PD-OL network and 99.2% of performance over target net-
work. The PD-SL network also achieved a high performance
over target network.
The worst results came from the PD-OL network and the
greatest accuracy was achieved by the NPD+PD-SL network,
where the images from problem domain improved the perfor-
mance by only 0.1%.
D. Microsoft Azure Emotion API
TABLE V: Performance Results for the Microsoft Azure
Emotion API
Networks Macro Average(accuracy)
Performance over
target network
Microsoft Azure Emotion API 35.1% –
NPD-SL 34.1% 97.3%
PD-SL 35.4% 100.8%
NPD+PD-SL 34.8% 99.2%
As can be seen, the Microsoft Azure Emotion API per-
formed poorly (35.1%) in the test dataset when compared to
the results of the FER experiments. Nonetheless, the copycat
networks managed to achieve a performance very close to the
API. Without using any data from the problem domain (NPD),
the copycat network achieved 97.3% of the performance
over the target network. Using only data from the problem
domain, 100.8% of performance over the API was achieved.
Surprisingly, combining both was worse (−0.6%) than using
only problem domain data.
E. Discussion
A comparison between the performance of the copycat
networks and baselines is presented in the Figure 3. It can
be noted that networks trained with stolen labels were able to
achieve high performance over target network. Moreover, the
copycat networks were also better than the PD-OL network.
This indicates that, to create a copycat network of a given
model, it may be more important to copy target network
predictions (including its mistakes) than to use a smaller
version of a real dataset (where images are correctly labeled).
Therefore, stolen labels seem to be appropriate for this task.
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Fig. 3: Performances of all experiment networks (PD: problem
domain, NPD: non-problem domain, OL: original labels, SL:
stolen labels) over relative target network
NPD-SL networks show that it is feasible to create a copycat
of a model of interest with high performance by just using
a high number of random natural images not related to the
problem domain. In addition, it showed that a large set of non-
problem related images with stolen labels (NPD-SL) can be
more effective in replicating the original network performance
than a smaller set of problem related images with correct
labels. Results with the PD-SL network showed that stolen
labels can be more effective in copying the accuracy of a
model than original correct labels.
The highest performance was achieved by NPD+PD-SL
networks. This fact indicates that data from the problem
domain helps improving the accuracy, although it may be not
always worth (i.e., sometimes the cost of having an annotated
labeled dataset is prohibitive and improvements are uncertain).
In the Microsoft Azure Emotion API experiment, the copy-
cat networks managed to achieve a performance very close
and better than the API, despite of the poor performance of
the API on the test dataset. The results of the NDP-SL showed
that random natural images are enough to copy 97.3% of the
performance of the API, when evaluated on the FER test set.
In addition to the experiments described in this paper,
some of the decisions were based on preliminary results. For
example, the images of the NPD were converted into grayscale
for the FER problem because the models trained using color
images performed slightly worse (≈ 2% less of accuracy).
Moreover, at an earlier attempt, we tried to ensure that the
copycat networks were trained using the same distribution
of samples per class as the target network. To ensure this,
after being labeled by the target network, a lot of images
(more than 40% from both NPD and PD) had to be discarded.
Nevertheless, preliminary results showed that this was not
beneficial to the copy process. Perhaps the lower number of
images reduced the capacity of the copycat networks to mimic
the decision frontiers of the target model. This needs further
exploration.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a novel approach to create a
copycat of a deep CNN model using only random unlabeled
natural images. Many companies are providing cloud-based
solutions powered by deep learning models. Given the neces-
sary investments, it is their best interest to protect these models
against attacks, such as the one hereby investigated.
Results showed that it is possible to achieve a performance
very close to the original network (minimum of 93%, in
our experiments) without using any data from the problem
domain. In addition, the copycat networks were always a
better alternative than training with a small database from
the problem domain (i.e., they were always better than the
PD-OL networks). When compared to the target network, the
highest performance was achieved by NPD+PD-SL networks:
98.6%, 98.6% and 99.3% over target network for FER, GOC,
and SCC. Moreover, copycat networks successfully copied
at least 97.3% of the performance of the Microsoft Azure
Emotion API. In conclusion, the copycat of a black-box model
is feasible and companies should worry about it.
Although this investigation showed interesting results, it
has some limitations. First, all the problems investigated have
a low number of output classes. It would be interesting to
investigate this technique with hundred or thousand classes.
Second, the process of copying could be tried in a higher
number of problems.
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